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Turkey experienced a severe banking crisis in 2001 that resulted in huge social
and fiscal costs since most defaulting banks had already been compulsorily trans-
ferred to a publicly-held fund (the deposit insurance fund).  Basing ourselves on
estimations by Burnside et al. [2003, NBER Working Paper], we further investigate
the links between these fiscal costs and the subsequent debt deflation that occurred
in Turkey after the crisis.  Our analysis also draws extensively on the Fiscal Theory
of the Price Level (FTPL) and on the empirical methodology originally proposed by
Canzoneri et al. [2001, American Economic Review].  Our main results are twofold.
First, the fiscal costs attributable to the banking crisis can be given a FTPL inter-
pretation and debt deflation appears as a deliberate policy.  Second, the FTPL
interpretation is not reliable over a time span excluding the most recent years, and
the public management of the banking crisis can be considered as an "exceptional
circumstance".  The policy implications are then that without a substantial
improvement in the management of banks, a dramatic economic episode like the
2001 crisis could again occur and the Turkish disinflation efforts could be wasted
and lost for a long period.  Hence, converging towards the EU standards in terms
of deregulation seems a reasonable condition for avoiding long years of high deficits
and inflation.
JEL classifications: F31, E62, E63
S ince 1987 and its first membership application, Turkey has neverbeen so close to the standards of the European Union (EU).  Therelationships between Turkey and what was called at the time the
European Economic Community started in 1963 with the Ankara
agreement that paved the way to a customs union which became a
reality in 1996.  During the Helsinki summit (1999), the EU officially
acknowledged Turkey's application. The European Council in
Copenhagen in December 2002 strongly welcomed "the important
steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria"1 and
encouraged it to pursue the reform process energetically (EC, 2003).
It concluded that "if the European Council in December 2004, on the
basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides
that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union
will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay"; hence, a
deadline was set for responding to the application and for eventually
proposing that membership be scheduled.  
There are still numerous obstacles to full membership, however.
Despite recent improvements, the Kurdish issue has not yet been solved
in Turkey.  Although Turkey has, for instance, ratified two major UN
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Social and Economic
Rights, the European Commission still argues that "political, civil,
economic, social and cultural rights" are not fully guaranteed and that
"more efforts are needed to enhance the coherence of legal provisions
and practice" (EC, 2003).  As for religion, the proposition by some
governments to mention the Christian nature of the EU in the draft of
the European constitution in 2003 is one example of the indirect
obstacles to full membership for a country without a (wide) Christian
tradition.  Going beyond politics and religion, the economic situation in
Turkey is also still worrying: inflation is not definitely under control and
very large fiscal primary surpluses are still necessary to curb public debt
dynamics and halt monetisation.  Though inflation, deficits and debts
are not part of the criteria to be met in order to enter the EU, they
are of importance.  First, they may enlighten the relationship between
the central bank and the government and show if the central bank can
be labelled "fully-independent" or not; second, EU membership entails
participation in a fixed exchange-rate system (ERM II) whose functioning
is not independent of monetary and fiscal policies.
A comprehensive understanding of macroeconomic features in
Turkey necessitates that their historical context be described in some
detail: in a country which had applied an elaborate import-substitution
strategy until the early 1980s before moving to today's wide-open and
liberalising Turkey, the changes in the economy have been profound,
the possible exceptions being inflation trends and the size and scope
of government activities2.
Transition towards the EU has also been slowed down by major
currency crises: in 1994 and again in 2001, the Turkish Lira (TL) depre-
ciated by almost 100% following speculative attacks.  In 2001, the
exchange-rate anchor vis-à-vis the US dollar and the euro had to be
abandoned and Turkey adopted a flexible exchange-rate regime.  
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1. The membership conditions laid down at the Copenhagen summit (1993) incorporate a
political criterion which pays particular attention to human rights and respect for minorities.
2. For a more extensive presentation of the Turkish economy, see Esfahani (2003).
In this paper, we pay much attention to the relationship between
fiscal policy, inflation and the most recent crisis, whose roots are to be
found in currency turmoil and banking weaknesses.  Despite close links
between both roots, the 2001 crisis had more of its origins in the
banking system than the former 1994 crisis, and the 2001 banking crisis
has also had huge consequences in terms of budget deficits on a scale
not witnessed since 19943 .  The fiscal cost of the recent banking crisis
is understood to have modified fiscal policy at that time and given rise
to a deliberate policy of inflating and depreciating the currency in order
to provoke a debt deflation– a debt relief to cover the fiscal costs.
This explanation (see Burnside, 2004; Burnside et al., 2003) is quite
appealing, though it lacks an empirical investigation of the causality
between fiscal policy and inflation.  We thus turn towards the Fiscal
Theory of the Price Level (FTPL, hereafter) and the recent empirical
methodology developed by Canzoneri et al. (2001) to give an
assessment of this likely policy change and of its causality.  
1. The currency crises
Turkey’s transition towards a market economy began soon before
the Coup d’État of September 1980.  At that time, the import-substi-
tution strategy no longer appeared sustainable because the Turkish
economy was plagued by substantial external indebtedness.  Turkey was
no longer able to import the intermediate goods that were crucial to
the production of domestic final goods.  The Lira was devalued in early
1980, public prices were increased to reduce public deficits and financial
markets started being liberalised.  Neither the Coup d’État nor the
return of democracy in 1983 modified this trend towards a market
economy.
The eighties witnessed a sharp acceleration in GDP growth, and a
surplus on current account, at least until 1987 for the latter (see
table 1).  In 1989, capital movements were liberalised, the convertibility
of the TL was adopted and foreign currency holdings by residents in
Turkey were authorised.  Between 1989 and 2001, the degree of
openness doubled and exports soared.  Unfortunately, in the early
nineties, monetary and fiscal stances have radically changed by
comparison with the late eighties: money supply growth and primary
deficits have resumed (see table 1).  
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3. Isik and Hassan (2003) argue that the 1994 crisis had a major impact on foreign and small
banks whereas “public banks apparently passed through the crisis unharmed”.  This was not the
case in 2001, as we shall argue in what follows.
One prominent drawback with the second situation has been the
recourse to foreign creditors to finance a substantial part of the public
deficits (see figure 1): though external public debt had been reduced
since 1988, it rose again between 1991 and 1995.  Almost simultane-
ously, total public debt was increased by 13% of GNP.  Moreover, the
steep rise of foreign investment in the early nineties (see figure 2) had
a major drawback: although it helped to finance the Turkish economy,
it was predominantly constituted of portfolio investment whose
volatility has been very substantial and has jeopardised the financial
stability of the whole economy.  Data in figure 2 testify to this usual
phenomenon: as soon as uncertainty arises regarding the capacity of a
country to sustain its exchange-rate regime or its fiscal policy, the so-
called hot money vanishes.  From 1993 up to the 1994 crisis, for
instance, foreign capital in Turkey decreased by US $ 3.5 billion.  In
1998 and again in 2001, portfolio investment even turned sharply
negative, possibly amplifying the crises.
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GDP 
growth 
Current 
account 
Primary 
surplus 
Lg term 
int. rate 
Public 
debt 
Base money 
growth 
CPI-based 
Inflation rate
 (%) (% GNP) (% GNP) (in %)* (% GNP) (in %) (%) 
1980 – 2.4 4.9 – 2.5 — 24.5 45.0 110.2 
1981 4.8 — – 0.6 — 29.1 104.7 36.6 
1982 3.1 — – 0.7 — 32.9 45.5 30.8 
1983 4.2 3.1 – 0.7 — 48.6 31.6 37.1 
1984 7.1 2.4 – 2.4 — 47.7 93.9 49.7 
1985 4.3 1.5 – 0.3 — 44.0 65.0 44.2 
1986 6.8 1.9 – 0.2 — 46.4 23.4 30.7 
1987 9.8 0.9 – 0.5 — 52.3 48.5 55.1 
1988 1.5 – 1.8 0.8 — 56.4 89.4 61.6 
1989 1.6 – 0.9 0.3 59.8 47.6 53.0 64.3 
1990 9.4 – 1.7 0.5 54.0 37.1 32.1 60.4 
1991 0.3 0.2 – 1.5 80.5 39.2 86.7 71.1 
1992 6.4 – 0.6 – 0.6 87.7 41.8 93.7 66.0 
1993 8.1 – 3.5 – 0.9 87.6 40.8 48.9 71.1 
1994 – 6.1 2.0 3.8 164.4 49.8 51.2 125.5 
1995 8.0 – 1.4 3.3 121.9 47.5 92.3 76.0 
1996 7.1 – 1.3 1.7 135.2 49.0 87.2 79.8 
1997 8.3 – 1.4 0.1 127.2 47.4 – 30.7 99.1 
1998 3.9 1.0 4.3 122.5 45.9 – 32.4 69.7 
1999 – 6.1 – 0.7 1.8 109.5 57.1 384.1 68.8 
2000 6.3 – 4.9 5.3 38.0 59.4 – 52.1 39.0 
1. Some key macroeconomic indicators in Turkey 1980-2000
*: annual average.
Sources: DPT, SPO, Central bank of the Turkish Republic.
Neither public deficits per se nor foreign credit are solely respon-
sible for a currency crisis.  The instability of the financial system or the
illiquidity and the insolvency of banks can also deeply influence the
whole economy as they convey information on the unreliability of bank
credits to finance domestic investment.  In the case of Turkey, the
situation of the banking system has been largely driven by the situation
of the public finances.  In fact, Turkish banks for a long time borrowed
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abroad at relatively small rates of return in order to buy domestic public
bonds whose rates of return were quite high (table 1). Thus, banks did
not finance domestic investment and, meanwhile, they were increasing
Turkey’s exchange-rate exposure, which made self-fulfilling currency
crises more probable and more dangerous for the economy.  The fact
that Turkish banks were neglecting the exchange-rate risk was also due
to a deliberate policy of depreciating the TL vis-à-vis the US dollar in
order to fully compensate for inflation: borrowing abroad was always
profitable since the borrowed amount had its value increased after the
foreign currency had been converted in TL; meanwhile, Turkish govern-
ments had to offer high rates on TL-denominated bonds to attract
creditors.
Another important mechanism led to self-fulfilling currency crises:
contingent liabilities.  Burnside (2004) and Burnside et al. (2003) strongly
highlighted the risk that government guarantees, contingent on an event
like a steep currency depreciation, may change the behaviour of banks
in anticipation of this likely event and, therefore, may increase rather
than decrease their fragility as they would face little incentive to reduce
their risk exposure.  Hence, governments bear an indirect and important
responsibility in the domestic financial turmoil: the insurance against
contingent risk they provide to banks may produce a vicious circle that
eventually leads banks to make bad loans or dissuade them from
hedging against exchange-rate risk.  In fine, governments should bear
the costs of bank failures.  
In Turkey, until 1999, bank supervision had been the co-responsi-
bility of the Treasury and the national central bank.  Since the “rules
vs. discretion” debate4 has crept into macroeconomic literature, the
close institutional relationship between fiscal policy, monetary policy and
financial supervision has been largely questioned and has been expected
to prevent public authorities from building on credibility vis-à-vis private
agents, be they residents or non-residents.  Conventionally, the Turkish
authorities went on to adopt a new banking law in June 1999 that paved
the way for the independence of supervision bodies.  Moreover, the
new Council for banking supervision and monitoring also manages the
Deposits Insurance Fund (DIF), which gives the possibility of taking
control of insolvent banks, restructuring their assets and compulsorily
selling them off.  In late 1999, 5 banks whose losses were estimated at
2.2% of GNP were compulsorily purchased by the Fund.  
Unfortunately, the Stabilisation Plan5 laid down by the IMF in
December 1999, which was intended to stop inflation and unsustainable
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4. Following the Kydland-Prescott (1977) — Barro-Gordon (1983) thesis.
5. The Plan was based upon a nominal exchange-rate anchor (with gradual flexibility at a
18-month-horizon), a strict monetary policy according to which base money moves hand-in-hand
with the Central bank net external assets, and a restrictive fiscal policy, most notably through a
VAT increase and the diminishing of payroll expenditures.  For more details, please refer to the
website of the Turkish Treasury (http://www.hazine.gov.tr/english/announce/sb_english.htm).
public-debt dynamics, was so successful that it soon placed the Turkish
economy on an overheating trend.  The decrease in nominal interest
rates, with real rates turning out to be negative, reduced the costs of
debt and boosted economic growth, essentially due to the boom of
durable goods consumption which had been delayed in 1998 because
of high nominal rates.  Consequently, attention was diverted from
external indebtedness, though it soared again, as well as from the
continuation of structural reforms, most notably as regards the financial
system.  In November 2000, overheating and the Argentinian crisis
slowed down internal and external confidence in the performance of
the Turkish economy.  Domestic banks, which were still largely invested
in domestic public bonds, had an urgent need for liquidity; consequently,
they started selling public bonds and thus participated in the rise in
public yields.  The loss of foreign capital also had a major impact on
these yields since it was followed by a substantial decrease in base
money that intensified the liquidity crisis (cf. footnote 5). On 4
December 2000, the short-run overnight nominal interest rate went up
to 2,000%.  Although the crisis was stopped, at least partly thanks to
the interventions of the IMF and the World Bank (which injected US
$ 15 billions in the Turkish economy), contingent liabilities of the Turkish
State remained: the rise in the short– and long-term interest rates
placed a heavy burden on banks, as they were relatively unable to grasp
financing flows on the interbank market.  In late 2000, the 6th most
important bank in Turkey was transferred to the DIF.  
Hence, at the beginning of 2001, the Turkish economy was severely
hit by interest-rate hikes, by the deterioration in the position of banks,
by the rising losses of banks transferred to the DIF and by the loss of
the central bank’s exchange-rate reserves.  The overall situation was
liable to provoke a speculative attack against the Turkish Lira.  
The currency crisis reached its climax in February 2001 and led the
central bank to abandon its restrictive policy as well as the nominal
anchor of the TL against a basket of euro and US dollar.  The subse-
quent rise in the interest and inflation rates, as well as the depreciation
of the TL, have been disruptive for the whole banking system and have
largely increased the social cost embedded in the DIF: up to 18 banks
were transferred to the DIF and their losses reached 17% of GNP.
2. Assessing the fiscal costs of bank bailouts
Burnside et al. (2003) have given an assessment of the costs of
currency crises on banks and, consequently, on governments whose
behaviour is hindered by the bailout clause, explicit or otherwise.  This
clause behaves like a contingent liability and is thus intended to drive
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governments’ behaviour.  Burnside (2004) precisely defines the under-
lying mechanisms at work: “Once a contingent liability has been realised,
a government must take one or more of the following actions: (i)
explicitly default on some portion of its debt, (ii) receive greater
transfers from abroad, (iii) increase its seigniorage revenue, (iv) deflate
the real value of local currency debt or (v) implement fiscal reforms
that result in a higher primary surplus.” (p. 27)  Burnside argues that
only the three latter points are of interest and he discusses their impact
on the probability of a crisis driven by self-fulfilling expectations.  Most
noteworthy, the initial stock of nominal public debt is a key factor in
reducing the probability of a severe currency crisis: the higher the initial
debt, the greater the revenue from nominal debt deflation and the
lower the need for seigniorage revenues.  
The Turkish case is a very interesting one within this framework.
According to Burnside et al. (2003), the fiscal cost of the banking-sector
bailout in 2001, via the DIF, was approximately an astonishing 18.2% of
Turkey’s GDP in 2000, and it is thus worth assessing how this cost has
been distributed among the afore-mentioned points (iii) to (v).  The
methodology for constructing the contributions of various sources of
financing to total fiscal cost can be summarised as follows.  The changes
in government revenue and expenditure flows as a result of the crisis
are first decomposed into three components: changes due to declines
in real activity, changes due to declines in the relative price of non-
traded goods6 and a residual term which is being ascribed to “explicit
fiscal reform” (explicit changes in the tax system, or cuts in quantities
of goods and services purchased by governments).  After having
withdrawn “explicit fiscal reforms” from the fiscal cost of the banking
crisis, the “net fiscal cost to be financed” is allocated between changes
in seigniorage, debt deflation (through price increases and/or exchange-
rate depreciation), changes in transfers, taxes and purchases which are
due to changes in the relative price of non-traded goods, and what has
still been unpaid.
According to Burnside et al. (2003), “explicit fiscal reforms” in
Turkey amounted to 3.3% of GDP while lost revenue due to the post-
crisis recession was 4.4% of GDP.  Among the resulting “net fiscal cost
to be financed”, amounting to 19.3% of GDP, 7.3% was raised through
a substantial decline in the dollar value of Turkey’s domestic debt, and
a mere 1.8% of GDP through increased seigniorage revenues (table 2).
A comparison with the Mexican case, after the currency crisis of
1994 (table 2), sheds some light on the specificities of the Turkish case.
First, though the post-crisis recessions were quite similar (when
expressed in percent), the change in the ratio of the GDP deflator to
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6. It is assumed that a currency crisis provokes a tightening of external borrowing constraints
which makes agents substitute tradable goods for non-tradable goods, inducing a fall in the relative
price of the latter.
the nominal exchange rate (i.e. the change in the relative price according
to the terminology used by Burnside et al., 2003) was on average twice
as high in Mexico as in Turkey.  Assuming a constant foreign inflation
rate, it can be inferred that competitiveness grew much more in Mexico
than in Turkey after their respective crises.  Since the depreciations of
the exchange rate in the first year of each crisis were also quite similar
(the appreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis the Mexican peso and that
of the US dollar/euro basket vis-à-vis the TL were equal to 50%), the
most substantial difference between the two experiences was the trend
of the inflation rate: prices rose more rapidly in Turkey than in Mexico.
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Date of the crisis Turkey   
Feb. 2001 
Mexico   
Dec. 1994 
Changes in real GDP after the crisis (%)   
Year 1 – 10.5 – 9.2 
Year 2 – 7.2 – 7.6 
Changes in relative prices after the crisis (%)   
Year 1 – 21.0 – 32.0 
Year 2 – 10.9 – 29.6 
Changes in government budgets after the crisis (% of GDP)   
Fiscal cost of banking crisis 18.2 15.0 
Explicit fiscal reforms 3.3 – 2.5 
Change in revenue due to recession – 4.4 – 6.5 
Net fiscal cost to be financed 19.3 24.0 
Increase in seigniorage 1.8 1.7 
Debt deflation 7.3 1.7 
Change in primary balance due to change in relative prices 1.2 9.1 
Amount as yet unpaid  10.1  11.5  
2. Changes in output, relative prices and budgets after recent currency crises 
Source: Burnside (2004).
The second key difference is related to the former: the Turkish
government has relied much more on debt deflation in order to bear
the fiscal cost of the banking crisis than the Mexican government did.
This points to the relationship between inflation and public debt in
Turkey: Burnside et al. (2003) show that most public debt has a
relatively low maturity (never exceeding 3 years) but is, meanwhile,
almost exclusively non-indexed.  We consider that this feature paves
the way for an interpretation of the public debt-inflation nexus within
the framework of the FTPL (Cochrane, 2001; Woodford, 2001).
The FTPL states that a government can exogenously set its real
spending and revenue plans, and that the price level will take on the
value required to adjust the real value of its contractual nominal debt
obligations to ensure government solvency.  The price level is thus a
“jump” variable which satisfies the government present value budget
constraint (PVBC).  
Consider the government flow budget identity:
Bt+1 = (1 +it) Bt – St+1, where Bt is public debt at the end of period
t, it is the return on public debt, and St is the primary surplus.  Expressed
in terms of GDP shares, this constraint can be formulated as:
and with pt the price level and yt real GDP.  
Assuming the expected real rate to be constant, the flow condition
can be solved forward to yield the present value budget constraint: 
. (1)
Equation (1) is an accounting identity.  Ex post, it should hold for
whatever value of the interest rate, the primary surplus or nominal
income.  Government solvency is ensured if the last term on the RHS
of equation (1) tends to zero when k tends to infinity.  This so-called
transversality condition ensures that the public debt to GDP ratio does
not increase by more than the gap between the interest rate and the
GDP growth rate (denoted here by r). The familiar sustainability
condition for public finances follows: 
.  (2)
The main outcome of the FTPL is in stating that there are two
different ex ante mechanisms that permit equality between the two sides
of equation (2).  In the first case, the fiscal authority adjusts its future
spending and taxes so that they meet the constraint for whatever value
of the interest rate and the nominal income.  In the second case, the
fiscal authority does not act in accordance with the fulfilment of its
budget constraint, so that the price level must move according to:
.  (3)
In this setting, where fiscal policy determines the price level, the
steady state is also conditional on monetary policy under-reacting to
the inflation rate (Leeper, 1991)7.
Stated in differences, equation (3) gives some scope for evaluating
the relationship and causality between the inflation rate and the change
in the public debt to GDP ratio.  Analogously to Canzoneri et al.
(2001)8, if fiscal authorities are not prone to satisfy their present value
budget constraint, a positive innovation in the primary surplus should
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7. Under-reaction means that an increase in the inflation rate leads to a reduction in the
ex post real interest rate.
8. Canzoneri et al. (2001) reject the FTPL interpretation of US fiscal data.  Creel and Le
Bihan (2004) have extended evidence to the major European countries and also reject the FTPL
interpretation in all countries.
reduce the price level and increase public debt, whereas in the other
case this innovation would help to buy back some debts, i.e. public
liabilities would fall.  A two-variable VAR in level should be sufficient
to differentiate between the two possible behaviours of the government
and thus possibly give a FTPL interpretation to Turkish fiscal data.
3. Investigating the FTPL in the case of Turkey
In a companion paper (Creel and Kamber, 2004), we have checked
the reliability of an open-economy version of the FTPL in Turkey,
placing strong emphasis on the links between public deficits, seigniorage
and the nominal exchange rate. In the present paper, and consecu-
tively to the conclusions of Burnside et al. (2003) as regards the fiscal
costs of Turkey’s recent banking crisis, we give preference to a closed
economy framework, where also seigniorage revenues are not at the
centre of the dynamics of inflation.  Both companion papers hence give
an assessment of the fiscal origins of the crisis, a currency crisis in the
former and a banking crisis in the present case.  One may argue that
the most recent crisis was a mix of both types and that the conclu-
sions arising from the two papers will then be complementary.  
Some previous works have already shown that Turkish budget
deficits could significantly affect current inflation (Metin, 1995, 1998;
Tekin-Koru and Ozmen, 2003)9 or inflation expectations (Celasun et al.,
2003).  However, these studies did not investigate the specific topic of
public debt deflation and could not shed light on the valuable conclu-
sions of Burnside et al. (2003). For instance, Metin (1995,1998)
assumed that public deficits were financed through base money creation
and she disregarded public debt dynamics and its denomination.  Tekin-
Koru and Ozmen (2003) also do not incorporate the domestic public
debt in their long-run relationships between the inflation rate, a
monetary aggregate and fiscal policy.  Though they claim to be inves-
tigating the FTPL, they disregard its short-run implications– the
short-run interactions between the interest rate and the primary surplus
(Leeper, 1991)– as they test for the relationship between the consoli-
dated budget deficit (therefore mixing up the interest on debt and the
primary surplus) and the inflation rate.  They also place much emphasis
on the importance of so-called “interest-bearing broad money” without
acknowledging that the implications of this broad money aggregate on
inflation and the fiscal origin of its increases should have led them to
incorporate the whole domestic public debt within the empirical
framework.
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9. See also Lim and Papi (1997).
Figure 3 plots domestically-owned public debt inclusive of base
money in Turkey10 and primary surpluses, exclusive and inclusive of
seigniorage revenues.  These revenues were quite huge until the late
nineties, as shown by the discrepancy between the two surpluses.  They
have been growing again during the recent banking crisis, though not
sufficiently to alleviate its consequent fiscal burden.  As for the overall
domestic public debt, this was relatively stable until the late nineties but
it has finally soared at the beginning of the new century.  The plotted
data would rather testify to a positive relationship between the primary
surplus and public debt, both expressed as a share of GNP, but this is
not a sufficient condition for giving an FTPL interpretation to the data.
This is due to the fact that, ex post, any government behaviour– satis-
fying or not satisfying the PVBC on an ex ante basis– are consistent
with the PVBC (equation (1)): a higher primary surplus in the future
permits a higher present debt (through a drop in the price index), while
a higher present debt is stabilised only insofar as a higher primary
surplus is accumulated in the future.  Distinction between these two
types of behaviour rests only on the reaction of the fiscal authorities
to a shock: will an unexpected increase in the primary surplus lead the
government to reduce its liabilities in the near future or not?  If the
answer is: ‘Yes’, one can reject the FTPL interpretation.  If it is: ‘No’,
the FTPL may gain some support.  
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10. In Creel and Kamber (2004), the total public debt– foreign currency-denominated and
domestic currency-denominated– is considered.  The variations in the nominal exchange rate thus
modify the total value of debt and interact with domestic fiscal policy.
Primary surplus inclusive of seigniorage revenues
Primary surplus
Public debt (% of GNP, right-scale)
Unit-root tests, applied to domestic public debt and to the primary
surpluses respectively inclusive and exclusive of seigniorage revenues
have led to the overall rejection of stationarity (see table 3); the three
above-mentioned variables are I(1) on the 1975-2002 sample.
However, the ADF-test and the KPSS-test give opposite results as
regards domestic public debt: it would be I(2) according to the former
and I(1) according to the latter.  Due to the small size of the sample,
results of unit-root tests are weak and may be non-robust.  Despite
potential non-stationarity of the data, we perform a VAR-in-level
approach which has proven stable.  The reason for performing this type
of approach lies in the prevalence of the short-run joint dynamics of
primary surplus and public debt which is at the core of the distinction
between a FTPL interpretation of the data and a non-FTPL interpre-
tation (cf. Canzoneri et al., 2001).
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3. Unit-root tests
1975-2002 dd  
(in level) 
dd 
 (in diff.) 
seig_sp 
 (in level) 
seig_sp 
 (in diff.) 
sp 
 (in level) 
sp 
 (in diff.) 
ADF t-stat – 0.37 – 0.89 – 2.08 – 4.91 * – 1.78 – 4.48 * 
Lag(s) 2 1 0 4 0 4 
KPSS 0.43(b) 0.20 0.62(a) 0.17 0.60(a) 0.29 
Note: dd is the domestic public liabilities, seig_sp is the primary surplus inclusive of seigniorage revenues, and sp
the primary surplus exclusive of seigniorage revenues, all expressed in % of GNP. Data are yearly.
Lag(s): lag length for ADF test selected according to AIC.
*: indicate rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 5% critical level for ADF test.
(a): indicate rejection at the 5% level of stationarity by the KPSS test (computed assuming no trend under the null).
(b): indicate rejection at the 10% level of stationarity by the KPSS test (computed assuming no trend under the
null).
Sources: SPO, Central bank of the Turkish Republic, IMF and authors' calculations.
As already mentioned, we wish to focus on the relationship between
inflation and public debt and thus have recourse to the links between
public debt and the primary surplus within a FTPL framework.
Considering the low contribution of seigniorage revenues to the recent
fiscal impact of the 2001 banking crisis, we first carry out a VAR incor-
porating the primary surplus exclusive of seigniorage revenues and
public domestic debt.  Substituting the surplus inclusive of seigniorage
revenues will also be considered, as a robustness test.
Identifying a surplus shock in a FTPL regime is relatively simple
because the surplus series is supposed to be exogenous.  Whatever
the level of output, interest rate and public debt, a FTPL regime assumes
no reaction by the fiscal authority.  Hence, the first equation of the
VAR, which describes the evolution of the ratio of the surplus to GNP,
is a forecasting equation in which the public debt to GNP ratio only
enters because of its value in forecasting future surpluses.  An
innovation to the first equation can then be identified as an exogenous
shock.
50
5
0
5
0
5
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1     2     3     4   5    6     7 8 9 10
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the VAR
computed for the ordering ‘surplus-debt’.  This allows for a contem-
poraneous effect on the domestic public debt, in accordance with a
FTPL regime.  The dashed lines represent the two standard deviation
bands.  Five tests (likelihood-ratio, final prediction error, Akaike,
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria) using a general-to-
specific procedure led us to include one lag.  
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4. Impulse response functions to a surplus shock exclusive
of seigniorage revenues (in %, sample: 1975-2002)
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5. Impulse response functions to a surplus shock exclusive
of seigniorage revenues (in %, sample: 1975-2000)
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The response of the domestic public debt to GNP ratio to an
innovation in the primary surplus exclusive of seigniorage revenues (in
% of GNP) is immediately positive and it is significant for the first three
years after the shock has occurred.  Such a positive response testifies
in favour of a FTPL regime: fiscal issues are prominent in explaining the
steep rise in prices in Turkey.
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6. Impulse response functions to a surplus shock inclusive
of seigniorage revenues (in %, sample: 1975-2002)
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7. Impulse response functions to a surplus shock inclusive
of seigniorage revenues (in %, sample: 1975-2000)
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Nevertheless, removing the last two years from the sample (figure 5)
would substantially modify the preliminary IRFs: the response of
domestic public debt to a surplus shock is no longer significant and it
is also negative in the short run.  Is it that the banking crisis of 2001
is a critical issue in explaining the apparent FTPL interpretation of the
relationship between public debt and the primary surplus only over the
most recent years, i.e. this relationship would have been an “excep-
tional circumstance” under which the fiscal burden of the crisis has
directly driven the inflation rate?  Or does it mean that seigniorage
revenues would be helpful in explaining to a greater extent the
relationship between fiscal policy and the inflation rate?  To tackle this
alternative, we have incorporated the primary surplus inclusive of
seigniorage revenues in the VAR and estimated the response of the
domestic public debt to a surplus shock over the two following samples:
1975-2002 and 1975-2000 (figures 6 and 7, respectively).
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Response of SEIG_SP to SEIG_SP Response of DD to SEIG_SP
Response of SEIG_SP to SEIG_SP Response of DD to SEIG_SP
Results are somewhat mixed.  Over the whole sample, the FTPL
argument is given more weight: the positive response of domestic public
debt to a surplus shock is higher than when the shock had occurred
on the surplus exclusive of seigniorage revenues.  It can testify to the
substantial influence of “interest-rate broad money” on public debt
dynamics, hence confirming the statistical results by Tokin-Koru and
Ozmen (2003) but, here, within a FTPL context.  
However, over a shorter sample (1975-2000), the (still) positive
response of domestic public debt to a surplus shock is no longer statis-
tically significant and the FTPL hypothesis is thus largely questioned.  It
seems as if the theory had been given some weight only over the most
recent period, after the banking crisis led to huge social and fiscal costs.
There is thus some room for concluding that the debt deflation that
has occurred in Turkey in 2001 has actually modified the behaviour of
the fiscal authorities, but only recently.  The link between fiscal policy
and debt deflation would be an “exceptional circumstance” and the
FTPL interpretation over the whole sample would simply be a statis-
tical artefact.  
4. Conclusion: the recent experiment
As our primary focus in this paper has shown, the profound banking
crisis that occurred in Turkey in 2001 has, at least temporarily, modified
the policy mix which had been applied in this country for some years.
In contrast to the restrictive fiscal policy and the attachment to a
nominal anchor (a basket of currencies) which had been implemented
since 1999, the year 2001 witnessed a sharp deterioration in the primary
surplus and a substantial debt deflation, which occurred mainly through
a temporary resurgence of high inflation.  This temporary change in the
behaviour of the fiscal authorities has had some roots in the FTPL.
However, on a shorter horizon excluding the most recent years, the
FTPL interpretation of Turkish fiscal data is unreliable.  
This is consistent with the recent trends in the Turkish economy.
The disinflation process has been continuing, albeit via a different
mechanism: inflation targeting has been substituted for the nominal
anchor strategy.  The stabilisation programme of January 2002, set in
accordance with the IMF, was drawn up with the following targets: an
annual inflation rate below 35% in 2002, 20% in 2003 and 12% in 2004.
In 2003, the target was met, despite the rapid resumption of economic
growth (+ 8% and + 5% in 2002 and 2003, respectively).  The imple-
mentation of an inflation target strategy has been accompanied by a
strategy of high interest rates which could (have) endanger(ed)
economic growth persistence.  However, a key element on the budget
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side intervened in late 2001 and has had positive consequences ever
since.  After the sharp depreciation of the TL vis-à-vis the US dollar in
2001, the banks were heavily burdened by their debts denominated in
US dollars.  In order to provide US dollars to the banks, the government
converted the TL-denominated Turkish public bonds owned by Turkish
banks into US dollar-denominated public bonds.  Thanks to this swap11
and to the subsequent appreciation of the Turkish Lira, the interest-
rate rise has not led to an increase in Turkish public debt.  Hence, the
swap has also been very successful in curbing the inflation rate.
Finally, among the challenges faced by Turkey in the near future,
restructuring the banking sector is one of the most crucial. Although
the EC (2003) notes that Turkey’s market regulations and institutions
have improved, that financial sector surveillance has been strengthened
and FDI legislation modernised, “the privatisation of state-owned banks
and enterprises as well as market deregulation has to be accelerated”.
Without a substantial improvement in the management of banks, there
would still be fears that a dramatic economic episode like the 2001
crisis could recur and that the disinflation efforts be wasted and lost
for a long period.  Hence, converging towards the EU standards in
terms of (de)regulation is, as far as Turkey is concerned, a clear
condition for avoiding long years of high deficits and inflation.  This also
means that the Commission’s Report and the European Council of
December 2004 might have almost final consequences on the road
taken by the Turkish economy: to be or not to be in Europe, “that is
the question”.
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